We model the natural evolution of private information over the life of a venture capitalist financed project. In the early stages, the entrepreneur is better informed regarding the project, and when the project matures, the venture capitalist has an informational advantage over the entrepreneur. Within this framework, we examine how the venture capitalist's relative bargaining power affects cash flow rights and investment. When the bargaining advantage lies with the entrepreneur, the project may not be screened, and the venture capitalist may acquiesce to excessive initial investment but subsequently terminate the project. Increased venture capitalist bargaining power encourages project screening, attenuates the incentive to overinvest, and reduces the incidence of project termination subsequent to the initial investment. The payoff sensitivity of venture capitalist's financing contract also increases as his bargaining power improves. 
Introduction
Entrepreneurs are likely to be better informed than venture capitalists about some aspects of their projects while venture capitalists are likely to be better informed about others. 1 Therefore, both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have to contend with adverse selection during their negotiations. While adverse selection is a constant feature of the environment in which venture financing is contracted, other features of the environment fluctuate. One important feature of the contracting environment that fluctuates significantly is the flow of capital into venture funds. 2 This variation in the flow of capital has been linked to dramatic fluctuations in the generosity of the terms of venture financing contracts. For example, Lerner (2000, 2004) document that, when a lot of capital flows into venture funds, venture capitalists appear to be under intense pressure to invest in projects: they tend to supply capital at generous terms, giving rise to the "money chasing deals" phenomenon that leads to increased cash flow shares for the entrepreneurs.
Recognizing the important influence of adverse selection on venture financing, researchers have devoted considerable attention to understanding its influence on the cash flow rights and other features of venture capital contracts. Some have focused on the optimal design of venture financing contracts when the entrepreneur is better informed than the venture capitalist while others have examined the effect of reversing this situation. 3 However, regardless of their approach to capturing adverse selection between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist, all these models share a common feature: they are all built on the assumption that the 1 The evidence in Strömberg (2003, 2004) suggests that control structures in ventures are engineered to limit problems arising from both the informational advantage of entrepreneurs and the informational advantage of venture capitalists regarding [external] risks. The intense screening of projects by venture capitalists is consistent the view that entrepreneurs have an information advantage over venture capitalists regarding some aspects of their projects. The idea that venture capitalists are informed investors is consistent both with Sahlman's (1990) evidence that venture capitalists specialize in a small number of industries and thus gain a deep understanding of those industries, and Lerner's (1995) claim that venture capitalists work closely with the companies they are financing. Hellman and Puri (2000) and Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008) provide evidence supporting the claim that venture capitalists are informed investors. 2 In its survey "Venture capital: Money to burn," The Economist (May 27, 2000) stated "It is clear that venture capital has been prone to periods of extreme boom and bust." In its next survey on the venture capital industry (April 3, 2004) , "After the droughtVenture capital," The Economist claimed that "the money available for investments in start-up companies slowed to a trickle after the bubble burst." 3 Dessein (2005) and Trester (1998) develop models where entrepreneurs are better informed than the venture capitalists, while Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) and Ueda (2004) develop models where entrepreneurs are only better informed than a subset of financiers. Garmaise (2007) develops a model in which the venture capitalist has an informational advantage over the entrepreneur.
entrepreneur has an absolute bargaining advantage vis a vis the venture capitalist. Therefore, these models are unable to help us understand how fluctuations in the pressure on venture capitalists to invest, by changing the strength of their bargaining position in negotiations over the division of a project's surplus, will alter both entrepreneurs' and venture capitalists' incentives to exploit their informational advantages.
To fill this void, we build a model where the outcome of venture financing is shaped by both the bargaining positions of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs and adverse selection between them. In our model, the entrepreneur has an informational advantage regarding the technology employed in the venture and her project's likelihood of successful scalability from a technological perspective. The venture capitalist, in contrast, is better informed about factors that are of great importance in later stages of projects: the management, marketing, and financial know-how needed to successfully commercialize a venture. Thus, the locus of information asymmetry switches over the life of a project. 4 The allocation of bargaining power between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur varies independently of their private information and is deter- We show that many features of optimal venture financing contracts vary greatly with the allocation of bargaining power. When a venture capitalist has an absolute bargaining advantage over an entrepreneur, the optimal contract minimizes the sensitivity of the entrepreneur's claim to project profitability. Granting the venture capitalist equity or convertible claims that can be exchanged for a greater ownership share of the project is one way to generate this sort of cash flow pattern. In contrast, when the bargaining advantage shifts to the entrepreneur, the optimal contract ensures that the venture capitalist's claim is relatively insensitive to the project's performance while the entrepreneur's claim is very performance sensitive. This can be achieved by giving the entrepreneur a claim resembling levered equity and the venture capitalist a debt-like claim that can be converted into relatively modest share of common equity
The optimal investment in the project tends to be distorted in response to the adverse selection prob-lems. The timing and nature of these distortions varies with the allocation of bargaining power. When the bargaining advantage lies with the venture capitalist, investment is distorted only during the later stages of the project, at which point he is privately informed. In this situation, the venture capitalist typically overinvests. In contrast, when the bargaining advantage switches to the entrepreneur, both early and late stage investments may be distorted. In this case the venture capitalist typically overinvests during the early stages and underinvests in the later stages. 5 Another feature of venture financing that is quite sensitive to shifts in bargaining power is project screening. When the bargaining advantage lies with the venture capitalist, the optimal contract always screens out the entrepreneur if her project is of poor quality. When the bargaining advantage switches to the entrepreneur, she is often able to obtain financing even for a poor quality project. 6 To compensate for this lax screening, the venture capitalist is more likely to terminate the project at a later stage. This result explains why venture capitalists are less selective and make relatively large initial investments in projects during venture financing booms. 7 These dramatic variations in the venture financing contracts are the result of changes in the relative importance of venture capitalist's and entrepreneur's adverse selection problems arising from alterations in their bargaining power. When the venture capitalist has an absolute bargaining advantage, he can exploit it to limit the entrepreneur's share of the project's rents. Since the entrepreneur can only receive a relatively small payout from the project, her potential gain from misrepresenting her private information is also relatively small. Therefore, the primary force shaping the venture financing contract is the need to limit the venture capitalist's incentive to exploit his private information to capture even more of the project's value than he can based on his bargaining advantage alone. In contrast, when the bargaining advantage switches to the entrepreneur, the contract is shaped by both adverse selection problems. Now the entrepreneur can exploit her bargaining advantage to secure a large share of the project's value. It is also easier for her to leverage her private information to add to her share of value. To counter the erosion in his share of the project's value, the venture capitalist has a strong incentive to understate the project's profitability.
The optimal contracts we derive suggest that venture capitalists are able to convert their claims to a larger 5 The intuition behind overinvestment during the early stage of the project is similar to De Meza and Webb's (1987) result that borrowers who have good prospects may signal their type by overinvesting. 6 Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) find similar results in their study of banking contracts. 7 For example, during the Internet boom, The Economist (May 27, 2000) reported that the venture capital industry "has become less cautious about valuations and has financed too many competing companies with dubious business plans." equity share under conditions of excess demand for venture financing or when they are highly reputable.
There is some evidence for this prediction. Supporting evidence is provided by Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) , who, using U.S. data, find that experienced VCs receive weaker downside-protected cash flowsi.e. cash flows that are more sensitive to project performance -than less experienced VCs. 8 The optimal cash flow sharing rules in our context also invert the relation between bargaining power and risk-allocations of optimal contracts derived by Inderst and Mueller (2004) .
In our analysis, the cost of screening out an entrepreneur with a poor project is endogenous. It rises with the entrepreneur's bargaining power because she is able to use it to leverage her private information.
Therefore, as the entrepreneur's bargaining power rises, it becomes more costly to screen and when the cost is sufficiently high it is optimal to stop screening. Therefore, we provide a novel explanation based on endogenous screening costs for Hochberg, Ljunqvist, and Lu's (2007), and Sorensen's (2007) findings that venture capitalists with greater experience make better investments and are less likely to finance poor projects.
Our paper falls in the interstice between two streams of research on venture capital financing. The first of these two streams focuses on the design of venture capital contracts when either moral hazard (see, VCs with more control rights or more experience are more likely to finance ventures with convertible securities -securities that have downside protection -than inexperienced VCs, who are more likely to use equity financing. 9 Market conditions or bargaining power also affect the composition of venture capitalists' portfolios (Kanniainen and the models in this stream of research, our model explicitly recognizes the effect of market conditions on rent sharing in venture financing contracts. To focus on the feedback effect from venture capitalists' financing decisions to their bargaining positions, these models abstract from the influence of information asymmetry on venture financing contracts by assuming that all information asymmetry is dissipated by a fixed cost paid by venture capitalists. Our model, instead, examines in detail the how information asymmetry and the relative bargaining position of the venture capitalist together shape contracts, and abstracts from the feedback effect from venture capitalists' financing decisions to their bargaining positions. By taking a different approach than this literature on cycles, we demonstrate that the screening costs involved in resolving information asymmetry between the venture capitalist and entrepreneur are not fixed as assumed in this literature.
Rather, they are endogenous and vary with relative bargaining power. Moreover, we are able to demonstrate that project terminations after initial funding are also driven by the same forces that drive venture financing cycles.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe our model and present details of the informational structure, agent payoffs, and the major assumptions. Section 3 contains an analysis of the optimal cash flow sharing rules and investments. In Section 4, we demonstrate how project screening is endogenous and varies systematically with bargaining power. In section 4, we demonstrate how the allocation of bargaining power is tied to conditions in capital markets and venture capitalist reputations.
Section 5 contains a discussion our analysis and some concluding remarks. Proofs of all results are presented in the Appendix.
The model
Consider a three date model. All agents are risk neutral, and the risk-free rate is normalized to 0. At date 0, an entrepreneur is endowed with a project but has no capital. The entrepreneur approaches a venture capitalist (VC) for financing. If the venture capitalist agrees to provide funding, I 0 is invested at date 0. At the next date, date 1, another investment, I 1 , is required by the project. Once again, the entrepreneur has no capital to invest in the project. Thus, the investment I 1 is also financed solely by the venture capitalist. Keuschnigg (2004) , Inderst, Mueller, and Munnich (2007) , and Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009) ). In addition, market conditions induce over-and under-investment in private equity (Axelson, Strömberg, and Weisbach (2009) ). An earlier paper by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) studies how timing of investments and financing choices are related to market conditions. These two investments generate a random cash flow X at date 2, the terminal date. 10 This cash flow has the two point support {1, 1 + X} , where X > 0. If the venture capitalist chooses not to finance the project or if it is abandoned at date 1, i.e., either I 0 = 0 or I 1 = 0 respectively, the project generates a cash flow of 0, the entrepreneur is forced to obtain employment elsewhere and earns her reservation wage. For simplicity, we assume that the entrepreneur's reservation wage for the first period, from date 0 to date 1, is 0, and her reservation wage during the second period (date 1 to date 2) is w.
Before approaching the venture capitalist at date 0, the entrepreneur observes a private signal i ∈ {G, B} that informs her of the technological feasibility of the project. Signal G indicates that the project is technically sound and has a "good" chance of succeeding, and signal B indicates that the project's technology and its chances of succeeding are "bad". The ex ante probability that the entrepreneur observes signal G is π. At date 1, before making the follow-on investment decision, the venture capitalist observes a private signal j ∈ {L, H} that informs him of the project's economic viability. For example, the venture capitalist's signal may convey information regarding demand for the product that will be produced. Because the entrepreneur's signal and the venture capitalist's signal inform the recipients about different aspects of the project's viability, we assume that the signals i and j are independent. Signal H is observed with probability ϕ and indicates that the project has a "high" likelihood of success while the signal L indicates that it has a "low" likelihood of success.
The cash flow from the project is jointly determined by the investment at date 0, the investment at date 1, the entrepreneur's private signal realization, and the venture capitalist's private signal realization.
Cash flow 1 + X is realized with probability P i (I 0 ) P j (I 1 ) and cash flow 1 is realized with probability
for all I 1 , and that both sets of functions are increasing and concave in the amount invested:
The project is more profitable if the entrepreneur observes G than if she observes B, that is,
, which implies that the project is more profitable if the venture capitalist observes H. We also assume that the likelihood of realizing the cash flow 1 + X is higher after observing 10 The model described here is consistent with the stylized facts about new venture financing. New ventures tend not to generate much in the way of operating profits and the primary incentive for venture capitalists to finance such ventures is to profit from the sale of the ventures rather than from capturing operating cash flows.
G, i.e.,
Similarly, to capture that the notion that the likelihood of project success is higher after observing H, we assume that
These assumptions are similar to the single crossing property employed in much of the adverse selection literature (see, e.g., Riley (2001)).
To eliminate the uninteresting case where risk-free contracts are feasible, we assume that w > 1 and the initial investment I 0 can be no lower than I 0 min > 1. To ensure that there exist internal optimal investment levels for the date 1 investment, we assume that P ′ j (0) = ∞ and P ′ j (∞) = 0 for j ∈ {L, H}. Similarly, we
This function represents project NPV when the probability of a type G entrepreneur equals ζ and the probability of a type H venture capitalist equals ϕ. We assume that the project is a positive NPV undertaking from the date 0 perspective if the entrepreneur observes signal G, i.e., we assume that there exist I 0 , I H and
Moreover, to highlight the effect of screening on project termination, we assume that if the entrepreneur observes signal G, there always exists a profitable follow on investment,
i.e. there exists I L such that
Finally, we assume that for all I 0 , I H and I L ,
and
The first of the two conditions in (5) 
Contracting
We employ the mechanism design approach to investigate the optimal financing contracts (see, e.g., Harris and Townsend (1981) 
Similarly, let V i j (α, γ, I 0, I 1 ) represent the expected payoff to the venture capitalist when the venture capitalist is type j and the entrepreneur is type i, that is
where i ∈ {G, B} and j ∈ {H, L}.
Informational problems of the nature we are examining often result in resource misallocation. The problem we are examining results in investment distortions. To put these investment distortions in context, we now establish some benchmarks. Let the conditional Pareto optimal level of investment at date 0 be
This condition ensures that, given the date 1 investments I H and I L , the marginal return on the date 0 investment equals its marginal cost. Similarly, the date 1 conditional Pareto optimal levels of investment,
respectively. Each of these investment levels results in the Pareto optimal allocation of resources, given the other investment decisions. The unconditional Pareto optimal investment occurs when all date 0 and date 1 investments are set at their conditional Pareto optimal levels.
Optimal Contracts
In this section, we characterize optimal contracts for two opposite ends of bargaining power distribution:
(1) the venture capitalist has an absolute bargaining advantage; and (2) the entrepreneur has an absolute bargaining advantage. We first characterize separating equilibrium outcomes where the contract terms are sensitive to the venture capitalist's signal. Then we derive pooling equilibrium outcomes where contract terms do not vary with the venture capitalist's date 1 signal. We end the section by demonstrating that these contracts are robust to date 1 renegotiation.
Outcomes where both the entrepreneur's and venture capitalist's information are revealed
When the venture capitalist has all the bargaining power, he will design contracts that maximize his own share of the cash flows. However, he has to pay a type G entrepreneur at least her reservation wage to induce her to participate in the project. Moreover, the contracts have to induce truthful signal reports by the entrepreneur and venture capitalist. Consequently, the optimal contracts solve the following problem:
Condition (12) ensures that a type G entrepreneur will be willing to have her project financed by the venture capitalist because, from a date 0 perspective, the entrepreneur's expected payoff is higher than her expected reservation wage. Similarly, (13) and (14) ensure that a type G entrepreneur will be willing to continue with the venture at date 1 after the venture capitalist reports signals H and L, respectively. Meanwhile, to ensure that investing in the project has a positive NPV, the contracts have to screen out the entrepreneur if she is type B. Conditions (15), (16) and (17) ensure that this screening is successful because the expected value to a type B entrepreneur is too low to satisfy her reservation wage at date 0 and when the venture capitalist reports his signal at date 1, respectively. Constraints (18) ( (19)) ensure that the venture capitalist truthfully reports signal H (L). Finally, Constraints (20) and (21) are included so that the venture capitalist finds it incentive compatible to continue with the venture at date 1.
When the bargaining advantage shifts to the entrepreneur, most of the constraints on the design of the optimal contracts remain unchanged. Specifically, the contracts have to satisfy (13) and (14) to ensure that the entrepreneur stays on with the project at date 1 if she is of type G. They also have to continue to satisfy (15) through (17) to ensure that a type B entrepreneur does not obtain financing. To ensure continued venture capitalist participation at date 1, the contracts have to satisfy (20) and (21), and to ensure that the contracts force the venture capitalist to truthfully reveal his private information at date 1, they have to satisfy (18) and (19) . However, two modification to the constraint set are required to deal with the shift in bargaining advantage. We impose the constraint
and remove the constraint (12) . The inclusion of (23) ensures that the venture capitalist will be willing to finance the project at date 0, and the second change is due to the fact that the modified contract design problem calls for the maximization of the entrepreneur's expected payoff. It follows that the optimal contract designs in this case solve the following problem:
subject to the Constraints (13) through (22) and Constraint (23).
Division of value
The allocation of bargaining power completely determines the division of the project's value when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage. If the venture capitalist picks contracts that satisfy the entrepreneur's date 1 participation conditions, (13) and (14), as equalities, he automatically satisfies the entrepreneur's date 0 participation constraint, (12) , and maximizes his share of the expected cash flow.
Moreover, because cash flows with a type B entrepreneur are first order stochastically dominated by cash flows with a type G entrepreneur, the contracts will satisfy type B's participation constraints, (15), (16), and (17), and thus, deter type B entrepreneurs. It follows that it is optimal for the venture capitalist to select contracts that satisfy the entrepreneur's date 1 participation conditions as equalities, allowing the venture capitalist to capture the project's entire NPV.
When the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage, the venture capitalist can use her private information to blunt the entrepreneur's advantage. Like the venture capitalist, the entrepreneur will attempt to capture the project's entire NPV. However, her ability to do so is limited by the venture capitalist's informational advantage at date 1. An optimal contract has to satisfy the type H venture capitalist's truth-telling constraint, (18) , to ensure that a type H venture capitalist truthfully reveals his private information. Together with constraint (21), which ensures a type L venture capitalist will want to invest in the project at date 1, constraint (18), ensures that a type H venture capitalist will expect to earn more than enough to invest at date 1. As the following lemma demonstrates, in some instances, in equilibrium, this premium may be large enough to ensure that the venture capitalist captures some of the surplus from the project, preventing the entrepreneur from capturing the project's entire NPV.
is a solution to the venture capitalist's problem, (11) , then
is a solution to the entrepreneur's problem, (24) , then
and there exist solutions where
Risk sharing
The allocation of risk varies dramatically with changes in bargaining power. First consider the case where the venture capitalist has the bargaining power. If he observes the signal L at date 1, he will have an incentive to misreport his signal and exploit his information advantage and get the entrepreneur to accept an overvalued contract. The size of the mispricing gain that type L can earn through mimicry is increasing in the riskiness of the entrepreneur's payoff following a venture capitalist report of H. As the extensive literature on contract design in the presence of adverse selection has established, type L's mimicry incentive is minimized by setting 1 − α H to its maximum feasible level and, thus, minimizing the riskiness of the entrepreneur's payoff. 13 Because this change in contract design can be made without altering the value of the contract, this approach to curbing type L's mimicry incentives is costless. Because there exists no incentive for type H to mimic a type L venture capitalist, in equilibrium a type L venture capitalist can also receive a contract that pays off only if the high cash flow, 1 + X, is realized.
The venture capitalist's incentives reverse when the entrepreneur has the bargaining power. Now the venture capitalist has an incentive to under-report the profitability of the project after observing H. By doing so he can counter the entrepreneur's efforts to restrict his share of the rents: a false report of L by a type H venture capitalist will net him the contract for type L. Because cash flows are higher under type H, the contract will have a higher value under type H, earning him a mispricing gain. The optimal contract must minimize this misreporting incentive. Setting α L = 1 achieves this goal by minimizing the sensitivity of the value of the venture capitalist's contract to his signal realizations. Underreporting profitability is not feasible after observing L. Therefore, the date 1 informational problem does not provide any incentive to restrict the design of the contract offered to the venture capitalist after he reports receipt of the signal H.
However, minimizing the sensitivity of a type H venture capitalist's payoff to the project's performance lowers the mispricing gain to a type B entrepreneur from misreporting her signal. Thus, to deter mimicry by a type B entrepreneur at date 0, in equilibrium, α H is set equal to 1. 14 The difference between the optimal allocation of risk under the two bargaining scenarios is formalized in the following proposition: 
is a solution to the entrepreneur's problem, (24) , then α * L = 1, and there exists a solution where α * H = 1.
Investment distortion
Costlessly minimizing mimicry incentives by adopting contracts described in Propositions 2 cannot always deter mimicry. In fact, when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage and the following condition is satisfied, adopting the optimal cash flow sharing rules alone cannot deter mimicry:
This condition will be satisfied when a type L venture capitalist's cost from distorting investment to mimic type H is low and, despite the adoption of the optimal cash flow sharing rules described in Proposition 2, mimicry by a type L venture capitalist will inflict a large mispricing loss on the entrepreneur.
In instances where (28) to the project's performance is even greater when the project is expected to be more profitable.
Similarly, investment may be distorted in equilibrium when we shift the bargaining power to the entrepreneur. Because she captures the surplus from the project, the type G entrepreneur will limit value dissipation resulting from investment distortion. The cash flow ordering Assumption (1) and
Outcomes where venture capitalist's information remains private
From Proposition 3 it is clear that in equilibria featuring full information revelation the possessor of the bargaining advantage may bear deadweight costs arising from investment distortion. To limit these deadweight costs, the advantaged party may prefer a contract that is insensitive to the venture capitalist's information, i.e. a "pooling" contract whose terms do not change with the venture capitalist's signal report.
Because the contract does not reveal the venture capitalist's information at date 1, the entrepreneur cannot condition her date 1 employment decision on the venture capitalist's signal. This considerably simplifies the contract design problem since it no longer needs to include any non-mimicry conditions for the venture capitalist.
When the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage, there are many possible pooling equilibria, each of which is based on a particular set of off-equilibrium beliefs. However, only equilibria that maximize the payoff of a type H venture capitalist survive most equilibrium refinements (see, e.g., Nachman and Noe (1994)). Therefore, we focus on characterizing the contracts that result in these pooling equilibria. These contracts solve the following problem:
subject to constraints
The first constraint, (30) , ensures that a type G entrepreneur will accept the contract at date 0 and stay with the project at date 1. The second constraint, (31) , ensures that a type B entrepreneur will not agree to the contract. The next three constraints, (32), (33) and (34), ensure that the venture capitalist will finance the project at date 0 and date 1.
Once again, satisfying the type G entrepreneur's participation constraint, (30) , as an equality both maximizes the venture capitalist's payoff and deters a type B entrepreneur. Because the venture capitalist's type remains hidden from the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur discounts the value of the contract to account for the possibility that the venture capitalist is type L. Minimizing the riskiness of the entrepreneur's payoff by maximizing 1 − α minimizes this discount. Increasing the date 0 and date 1 investment also lowers this discount because it lowers the probability of cash flow 1. Not only are the optimal cash flow sharing rules in these pooling similar to those in the separating equilibria we have previously characterized, with the exception of the date 0 investment, even the optimal investments are similar.
When the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage, the optimal contracts must solve the following problem:
subject to Constraints (31), (32) , (33) , (34) , and (35) .
In this case, the two forces driving the contract designs in the pooling equilibria, as is the case with the separating equilibria we have just characterized in Section 3.1, are the need to deter type B entrepreneurs and limit mispricing of the contracts arising from the venture capitalist's private information. These are the same forces that drive contract designs in separating equilibria when the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage. Therefore, as we demonstrate in the following proposition, when the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage, the contracts in pooling equilibria closely resemble those issued in separating equilibria.
Proposition 4 a. If
is a solution to the venture capitalist's problem (29) , then
and 
Renegotiation proofness of the equilibrium outcomes
As the preceding equilibrium outcomes demonstrate, when the bargaining advantage lies with the venture capitalist, he captures all the surplus generated by the project. By setting contract values to achieve this division of the project's value, he is able to efficiently resolve the adverse selection problem arising from the entrepreneur's private information. Consequently, optimal contract shapes and investments are geared only towards resolving the adverse selection problem arising from the venture capitalist's private information.
Therefore, the only deadweight costs arise because of investment distortions undertaken to deal with the venture capitalists' date 1 private information. It follows that, even though the contracts are designed at date 0, they cannot be successfully renegotiated at date 1 after the venture capitalist observes his private signal.
is a solution to the venture capitalist's problem, then the
Despite the possibility of both date 0 and date 1 investment distortion when the bargaining advantage rests with the entrepreneur, both the separating and pooling contracts characterized above may be renegotiation proof. That is, there is no other set of contracts that both the venture capitalist or the entrepreneur can agree on after the venture capitalist observes his private signal that will increase the payoff to at least one of them without reducing the other's payoff. When P B (I * 0 ) is sufficiently small the contracts are renegotiation proof, because investment distortions are not driven by the need to screen out type B entrepreneurs.
Contracts will also tend be renegotiation proof when P B (I * 0 ) is high so long as they do not call for overinvestment following signal L at date 1. 
With the loosening of Condition (5), the venture capitalist can continue to screen out type B entrepreneurs as we have demonstrated thus far. However, screening is no longer a necessary condition for equilibrium since undertaking the project regardless of the entrepreneur's signal realization can generate a surplus when the project's ex ante NPV is positive.
This change has no effect on the equilibrium outcomes when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage: the venture capitalist continues to offer contracts that screen out type B entrepreneurs. As we demonstrated previously, a contract that keeps a type G entrepreneur at her reservation wage ensures that a type B entrepreneur would earn less than her reservation if she obtained financing for her project.
Consequently, a type B entrepreneur can be screened out at no cost when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage. Now consider the pooling alternative where the venture capitalist does not screen projects. By financing the entrepreneur even after she observes signal B, the venture capitalist lowers the profitability of the project and, thus, his expected gain from investing. Therefore, as we demonstrate in the following proposition, when compared with the alternative of screening, it is prohibitively costly to the venture capitalist to offer the entrepreneur a "pooling" contract that provides financing regardless the entrepreneur's signal. Consequently, when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage, even when the project's NPV is positive ex ante, type B entrepreneurs will not receive financing and the primary driver of contracting is the venture capitalist's private information at date 1. This problem is essentially the same as the one examined earlier in Section 3.
In contrast, loosening the restriction on the project's ex ante value leads to significant changes when the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage. Under this allocation of bargaining power, as we demonstrated in the previous section, date 0 investment may have to be distorted to prevent a type B entrepreneur from obtaining financing. This distortion is optimal only so long as its cost is small relative to the reduction in profitability from financing the project regardless of the entrepreneur's type. Consequently, as we demonstrate below, there exist pooling equilibria where the venture capitalist will finance the project regardless of the entrepreneur's private information. These equilibria will prevail when either B signals only moderately negative NPV, i.e. P B is relatively high, or the ex ante probability of the signal G, π, is relatively high. For low values of π and P B , however, it is more cost effective to adopt contracts that deter the entrepreneur from obtaining financing after she observes the signal B.
While the venture capitalist may find it optimal to avoid screening out bad entrepreneurs at date 0 when B signals only moderately negative NPV, he may review his decision at date 1. Such a review will occur conditional on the venture capitalist signal L since, combined with the lack of date 0 screening this signal realization is more likely to render continuation a negative NPV proposition. 15 Therefore, as we demonstrate in the following proposition, in equilibrium, the lack of date 0 screening may be accompanied by project liquidation at date 1.
Proposition 7
Suppose that conditions (3) and (40) 
Bargaining power, market conditions, and experience
Until now we have focused on the two extreme allocations of bargaining power between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist. Moreover, we have operated with an exogenously specified allocation of bargaining
power. We now demonstrate that our results are not sensitive to these simplifying assumptions. By embedding our contracting problem between entrepreneur and venture capitalist in a market for venture financing,
we show that the outcomes we have characterized under these extreme assumptions are qualitatively similar to equilibrium outcomes for less extreme allocations of bargaining power that can arise endogenously.
To devise a simple market for venture capital financing, we assume that there exists a large number of entrepreneurs, each of whom has one project. All projects are identical to the project we have been examining thus far. It is common knowledge that each entrepreneur could be type G with probability π.
Each entrepreneur has to receive funding from one venture capitalist. There exist some experienced venture capitalists who have capital of $K, which is sufficient to fund both date 0 and date 1 investments in one project. The pool of entrepreneurs is too large to be financed by the established venture capitalists alone.
There is an unlimited supply of potential venture capitalists, each of whom has no capital but can raise $K from the capital markets at date 0. There is no difference between new and experienced venture capitalists other than the difference in their capital endowments. Conditional on financing a project, at date 1, each venture capitalist observes signal H with probability ϕ. At date 0, the venture capitalists compete with each other by offering entrepreneurs financing contracts. The market ceases to operate after date 0. Therefore, venture capitalists who shut down their project at date 1 do not have opportunities to invest their funds in new projects.
A new venture capitalist incurs a fixed cost of θ ≥ 0 to raise $K. This cost may reflect the present value of the premium a new venture capitalist has to pay to investors to raise capital. 16 This premium θ is likely to be higher when conditions in capital markets are tighter. Alternatively, θ can be interpreted as the cost of establishing the infrastructure necessary to become a venture capitalist. We assume that θ is smaller than project NPV. This ensures that new venture capitalists will be able to enter the market.
In equilibrium, new venture capitalists must be indifferent between raising capital to finance projects and staying out of the market. Therefore, a new venture capitalist will only finance a project if his expected payoff from doing so is at least equal to the amount he expects to invest plus the cost of financing, θ.
Moreover, entrepreneurs will be indifferent between obtaining financing from an experienced or a new venture capitalist. Therefore, in equilibrium, established venture capitalists will be able to offer contracts that enable them to extract as much of a project's value as new venture capitalists, i.e., experienced venture capitalists will expect to receive a rent of θ in addition to recovering the cost of their investment. An experienced venture capitalist's share of the project's value will vary directly with θ. Therefore, θ is in effect a measure of the bargaining power of an experienced venture capitalist.
We can easily incorporate the effect of variations in θ into our earlier analysis by solving for contracts that provide a type G entrepreneur with all the rents generated by her project in excess of θ and the cost of investment. For example, the only change that we have to make to our previous analysis to account for variations in θ on contracts that screen out type B entrepreneurs and reveal the venture capitalist's date 1 signal, is to require that the value of the venture capitalist's contract exceeds θ rather than 0, i.e., we need to change the venture capitalist's participation condition (23) which restricted his expected payoff to be non-negative to
Similarly, the only change that we have to make to our previous analysis to account for variations in θ on contracts that screen out type B entrepreneurs but conceal the venture capitalist's private information, is to require that the contracts satisfy the following condition
rather than the condition (32), which we had imposed earlier to restrict the venture capitalist's expected payoff to be non-negative.
Without putting more structure on project payoffs, we cannot obtain closed form solutions for the optimal investment levels and thus, cannot express the relation between θ and the optimal contracts in closed form. Therefore, we employ numerical techniques to illustrate the effects of varying θ and some comparative statics of our model. 17 Specifically, we assume that X = 300, w = 11, ϕ = 0.3, π = 0.5,
, and P L (I 1 ) =
. 18 The parameters λ B = 0.24 and λ L = 0.75 capture the difference between cash flow distributions across entrepreneur and venture capitalist types respectively. As is apparent from Figure 1 , increasing π, the ex-ante probability that the entrepreneur is type G, also raises the mimicry incentives of a type B entrepreneur because she can earn higher mispricing gains by 17 As is clear from the numerical solutions, they are qualitatively similar to the equilibrium outcomes we have described previously. When θ is relatively small, the equilibrium contracts are qualitatively similar to those that obtain when the entrepreneur has an absolute bargaining advantage. For relatively large values of θ, the equilibrium contracts are qualitatively similar to those that obtain when the venture capitalist has the absolute bargaining advantage. Therefore, the only incremental benefit from an analytical solution that incorporate the effect of θ would be to identify the precise value of θ at which contracting regime switches. 18 These functions are well-behaved probability functions and satisfy Conditions (1) and (2) conclusion that entrepreneurs get higher cash flow shares and projects receive higher valuations when more capital flows into venture funds (when θ is low). Empirically we should also observe that when venture financing conditions are tighter (when θ is high), initial investments are relatively small compared to later stage investments. To our knowledge, this empirical implication has not been tested.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have modeled a situation where an entrepreneur seeks funds from a venture capitalist for a project while both possess private information. Early in the project's life the entrepreneur has better information regarding its prospects. Towards the project's end, the venture capitalist is better informed about the prospects.
The bargaining power of the two parties vary based on the relative scarcity of venture financing. This variation is independent of the two agents' private information.
We demonstrate that, when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage, he is able to deny the entrepreneur a share of the project's surplus and use financing contracts that screen out entrepreneurs with poor projects. The terms of the contracts are driven primarily the venture capitalist's desire to signal private information and thus ensure that his payoffs very responsive to the project's performance. To signal positive information, the venture capitalist may also have a tendency to overinvest during later stages of the project.
The situation is dramatically altered when the bargaining advantage switches to the entrepreneur. Now the entrepreneur is able to appropriate most of the project's surplus. Consequently, it may no longer be possible to screen out entrepreneurs with poor projects. However, the venture capitalist may terminate the project after financing it initially. The venture capitalist may successfully use his private information to capture some of the project's surplus. Therefore, to limit the venture capitalist's surplus share, the optimal contract will ensure that his payoff is relatively insensitive to the project's payoffs and may call for underinvestment in the project's later stages. To derive our theoretical results, we assumed that the project has a liquidation value of 0 if it is terminated early. Our results wouldn't change qualitatively if we allowed for a positive liquidation value. The allocation of liquidation rights would largely follow bargaining power. When the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage, allocating the entrepreneur rights to liquidation proceeds makes it more difficult to screen out type B entrepreneurs. Thus, when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage he will allocate all the liquidation rights to himself. When the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage, allocating liquidation rights to herself limits her ability to prevent type B entrepreneurs from accessing financing.
When excluding type B entrepreneurs is of great importance, such as when the ex ante probability of an entrepreneur being type G is relatively low or the ex ante project profitability is extremely low, liquidation rights will be allocated to the venture capitalist, allowing him to capture project rents and the entrepreneur to enjoy the benefits of excluding type B from accessing financing. Otherwise, the entrepreneur will retain the liquidation rights, increasing the likelihood of pooling equilibria when the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage. These allocations of liquidation rights are consistent with Kaplan and Strömberg's (2003) evidence.
In our model, we considered a project that generates only a terminal cash flow. This assumption is reasonable because the major component of the return on venture investments arises from the sale of the venture to the public or to another company, which we view as the terminal date of our model. However, we could also allow for an interim cash flow and the analyze changes in cash flow rights over the life of the project.
If the interim cash flow is uninformative, i.e. it is not dependent on either the entrepreneur's or the venture capitalist's signal, then the forces that determine the division of this cash flow are virtually identical to those of liquidation rights. Giving the entrepreneur a claim on the interim cash flow would make mimicry a dominant strategy for a type B entrepreneur, and would raise the recipient's threat point in negotiations.
Thus, we should expect that, as in the case of liquidation rights, the entrepreneur will only receive a claim on this cash flow when she has the bargaining advantage and pooling with type B entrepreneurs is not very costly.
If the interim cash flow is dependent only on the entrepreneur's signal, the manner in which the cash flow is allocated can help screen out type B entrepreneurs. To minimize the mispricing gains from mimicry to a type B entrepreneur, the venture capitalist should receive a claim that is relatively insensitive to variations in the interim cash flow. This should be the case, regardless of who has the bargaining advantage. This sharing rule can be best achieved by financing projects by issuing claims to venture capitalists that have debt-like payoffs with respect to the interim cash flow. As a result, when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage, he will receive contracts whose sensitivity to venture performance increases over time.
This result is consistent with the pattern of decreasing liquidation rights of the venture capitalist described in Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) . Conversely, when the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage, the evolution in the sensitivity of venture capitalist's payoffs to project performance should be less marked.
Our analysis also poses several question for future research. Based on previous research, we know that less experienced venture capitalists have a greater incentive to form syndicates to improve their screening capabilities (see Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) ). Does the incentive to form syndicates vary over the venture capital cycle as well, since, according to our results, the propensity to screen investments varies over the cycle? Are differences in the screening propensities of venture capitalists reflected in the structures of their investment portfolios and exit strategies? are not terminated at date 1. We adopt the following parameterization to generate this figure: w = 11,
, λ L = 0.75, ϕ = 0.3, and X = 300.
We solve the case when the venture capitalist has the bargaining advantage in Appendix A, and the other case when the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in Appendix B.
Venture capitalist separating outcomes
To characterize the separating contracts, we first solve the venture capitalist's contract design problem after dropping the constraints (12), (15), (16), (17), (18), (20), (21), i.e., we solve the problem of (11) subject to Constraints (13), (14), (19) and (22) . Then, we show that the solution to this reduced problem satisfies the omitted constraints. It follows that the solution to the simplified problem is also the solution to the venture capitalist's contract design problem.
Let λ H , λ L , and λ V C be the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (13) , (14), and (19), respectively. Then the derivatives of the Lagrangian are as follows:
Result A.1 In every solution to the simplified problem of (11) the derivatives (A-3)-(A-7) must equal zero.
Proof. If the boundary conditions on γ H , γ L , I 0 , I H , and I L do not bind, then the partial derivatives are equal to zero by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The boundary conditions on I 0 , I H , and I L cannot bind because of our assumptions regarding the properties of the production functions P . If one of the boundary constraints
is 0, the venture capitalist receives the same cash flow at date 2 regardless of the project's outcome and the most he can receive is 1. This result contradicts our assumption that the project cannot be financed using riskless debt. If γ H (γ L ) is 1, the entrepreneur receives the same cash flow at date 2 regardless of the project's outcome, and the most she can receive is 1.
This result contradicts our assumption that w > 1. Hence the γ H and γ L must line in the interval (0, 1).
Result A.2 In every solution to the simplified problem of (11) both participation constraints must bind, i.e.
. It follows that
It follows that, because
Hence λ * H > 0.
Result A.3
In every solution to the simplified problem of (11) ,
Proof. From Result A.2, we know that λ * H > 0 and ϕ − λ * H − λ * V C < 0, and from Assumption (2) we know
follows directly from this result and the assumption P ′′ H < 0.
Result A. 4 In every solution to the simplified problem of (11) ,
Proof. Because 1 − ϕ > 0 and λ * V C ≥ 0, from (A-7) it follows that
The claim follows directly by comparing this expression with (10).
Result A.5 If there exists a solution to the simplified problem of (11) , there exists a solution where
Proof. First note that because Finally note that (11),
Proof. First note that
Then, from (A-5) it must be the case that
The claim follows directly from this result and the assumption P ′′ G < 0. (18) is satisfied as a strict inequality by any solution to the simplified problem of (11) .
Proof. First assume that λ * V C = 0. This implies that (13) and (14), constraint (18) can be expressed as
It suffices to show that (18) holds strictly for γ L = 1. Substituting γ L = 1 into the above expression reduces
We can write constraint (18) as
We can establish our result by showing that the inequality (A-12) is strict. Let
Now note that dg(R)
dR < 0, i.e. decreasing in R. This result combined with Assumption (2) results in the following inequalities:
Result A.8 A solution to the simplified problem of (11) , is a solution to the original problem, i.e., constraints (12) , (15), (16) , (17), (20) , and (21) in the venture capitalists' original problem are satisfied by any solution to the reduced problem.
Proof. As proved in Lemma A.2, constraints (13) and (14) always bind, The result for constraint (12) follows directly from that result as the left hand side of (12) is a weighted average of the left hand sides of (13) and (14) . The results for constraints (15) , (16) , and (17) follow by first order stochastic dominance argument in addition to constraints (13) and (14) (20) is satisfied because (21) is satisfied and (18) 
Venture capitalist pooling outcomes
To characterize the separating contracts we first solve the venture capitalist's contract design problem after dropping the constraints (31), (33) , and (34), i.e., we solve the following simplified problem (29) subject to constraints (30) , (32) , and (35) . Then, we show that the solution to this reduced problem satisfies the omitted constraints. It follows that the solution to the simplified problem is also the solution to the venture capitalist's contract design problem.
Let the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (30) and (32) be λ E and λ V C . Then the first order conditions for the Lagrangian associated with the simplified problem (29) are
Lemma A. 9 In any solution to the simplified problem (29) , α * = 0.
Proof. Because
Lemma A. 10 In any solution to the simplified problem (29) ,
Lemma A.11 In any solution to the simplified problem of (29) ,
Proof of Proposition 4 Part a. From the proof of Lemma A.9, we have that λ E > 0, and thus constraint (30) binds. Constraint (15) is satisfied by first order stochastic dominance. (33) and (34) follow by assumption (4). Hence the simplified problem of (29) is equivalent to the original problem, and Lemma A.9, A.10, A.11 prove the claims.
Renegotiation proofness
Proof of Proposition 5.
First we demonstrate that an equilibrium separating outcome cannot be successfully replaced by a renegotiated separating outcome at date 1. To see this, note that the equilibrium separating contracts are solutions to the simplified problem (11) . Renegotiated separating contracts must also satisfy constraints (13), (14), and (19) . Moreover, like the equilibrium outcome, under any renegotiated separating outcome the venture capitalist must invest the conditional Pareto-optimal level of investment following signal L. Otherwise the venture capitalist will always be better off defecting from the renegotiated contract, investing the conditional Pareto-optimal amount and offering the entrepreneur a contract worth w. Finally, note that, under the equilibrium contracts, the date 1 investment distortion must be minimized conditional on the signal H.
Therefore, under any renegotiated contract, investment conditional on the signal H cannot improve on the equilibrium outcome. Because the entrepreneur and venture capitalist are both risk neutral and the cash flows under the renegotiated contract cannot exceeds the equilibrium cash flows, renegotiation cannot leave either the entrepreneur or venture capitalist better off without hurting the other. Consequently, an equilibrium separating outcome cannot be successfully replaced by a renegotiated separating outcome at date 1.
Now we establish that an equilibrium pooling outcome cannot be successfully replaced by a renegotiated pooling outcome at date 1. To see this note that both the equilibrium outcome and the renegotiated outcome must satisfy constraints (30)- (32) . Therefore, once again, a renegotiated contract cannot improve investment choices or project value. Therefore, an equilibrium pooling outcome cannot be successfully replaced by a renegotiated pooling outcome at date 1.
To complete the proof we now demonstrate that an equilibrium separating (pooling) outcome cannot be successfully replaced by a renegotiated pooling (separating) outcome at date 1. To see this, note that the equilibrium contract will support separation (pooling) if the expected payoff generated by the equilibrium outcome exceeds the expected payoff under the most efficient date 1 pooling (separating) outcome. The above arguments establish that a pooling (separating) outcome renegotiated at date 1 cannot improve on the most efficient pooling (separating) outcome at date 0.
Appendix B: Advantage entrepreneur

Venture capitalist separating outcomes
We now characterize optimal contracts when the entrepreneur has the bargaining advantage. We first analyze optimal contracts when the contracts reveal the venture capitalist's private information. To characterize these contracts we solve the reduced problem of (24) with the constraints (13), (14) , (16) , (17), (18), (21), (23) and (22) . Then we show that the solution to this reduced problem satisfies the remaining constraints ( (15)), ( (19)) and (20) .
, and λ ICH be the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (13) , (14), (16), (17), (23), (21), and (18), respectively. Then the derivatives of the Lagrangian for the entrepreneur's simplified problem are
Result B. Proof. The proof is virtually identical to that for Result A.1.
Result B.2 There exists a solution such that
Proof. From (B-2) and (B-4), it follows that for any solution to the entrepreneur's reduced problem
.
Given that
, and Proof. From (B-1) and (B-3), it follows that in any solution to the entrepreneur's reduced problem
) . 
P B (I * 0 ) P G( I * 0 ) < 1 and
Result B.4 In every solution to this problem
Proof. First note that,
From (B-5) it follows then that
The remainder of the proof follows directly from this result and the assumption P ′′ G < 0.
Result B. (17) is a strict inequality and λ BL = 0,
, and by Assumption 2,
This inequality, together with
The remainder of the proof follows directly from the assumption P ′′ L < 0.
Result B.7 Any solution to the entrepreneur's reduced problem strictly satisfies constraint (20) .
Proof. Given the assumption that P H (I) > P L (I) for any I, we have
Because (21) and (18) 
Similarly, constraint (19) can be written
These two inequalities imply that
We can establish the desired result by showing that the inequality (B-12) is strict. To see this, let g(R) = 
Venture capitalist pooling outcomes
We now analyze optimal contracts when the contracts do not reveal the venture capitalist's private information. To characterize these contracts we first solve the reduced problem of (36) subject to Constraints (31), (32) , (34) , and (35) . Then we show that the solution to this reduced problem satisfies the remaining constraint (33) .
Let λ B , λ P V C , and λ V CL be the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (31) , (32) , and (34), respectively.
Let P 1 (I 1 ) = ϕP H (I 1 ) + (1 − ϕ)P L (I 1 ). Then using a virtually identical logic in the proof of Result A.1, it can be shown that in every solution to the entrepreneur's reduced problem, each of the FOCs, Proof. From (B-13) and (B-14), it follows that
) . Proof. Note that P ′ 1 (I 1 ) > P ′ 1 (I 1 ) 
Given that
These two condition imply that implies that (23) in the entrepreneur's problem (24) is satisfied by the renegotiated contract. Moreover, when P B is sufficiently small, (16) and (17) in this problem are also strictly satisfied. Therefore, any renegotiated separating outcome must satisfy all the constraints for the problem (24) . From inspection, it is also clear that any renegotiated pooling outcome must satisfy all the constraint for the entrepreneur's reduced pooling problem (36) . The desired result then follows from arguments virtually identical to those used to establish Proposition 5. 
for sufficiently small ϵ, it must be the case that -19) However this implies that The remaining constraints are satisfied by construction. The proof is completed by noting that because
and the venture capitalist's expected payoff is unchanged following signal L under the candidate solution, the entrepreneur's payoff must be higher.
